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Abstract 
This paper utilizes laboratory and field experiments to test the use of a provision point 
mechanism to finance renewable energy programs, commonly known as green pricing 
programs. The mechanism solicits discrete contributions towards a provision threshold 
using a money-back guarantee for insufficient contributions and extended benefits for 
contributions in excess of the threshold. In the laboratory, a single shot environment with 
a large group of potential participants produces contribution levels that are found to be 
partially demand revealing as well as motivated by altruism or wann-glow. Also, in 
contrast to most green pricing programs, relatively high participation is found in the field. 
Field participation is shown to be responsive to program goals and the provision point 
mechanism. 
JEL Classifications: H41 Public Goods, C92 Design of Experiments, Laboratory, Group Behavior, C93 
Design of Experiments, Field Experiments 
Key Words: public goods, provision point, green pricing, renewable energy, experiments, free riding, 
altruism. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite market research that has uniformly predicted substantial customer interest in 
paying higher electric power rates to support renewable energy generation and environmental 
programs, experience with green pricing indicates thatparticipation levels have fallen well short 
of predictions (Byrnes, Jones, and Goodman, 1999; Byrnes et aI., 1995; Farhar and Houston, 
1996).:1 Three explanations for this discrepancy seem possible. First, market research studies of 
hypothetical predicted program support may have been upwardly biased. Second, most utility 
customers may have been unaware of such programs, in spite of attempts by electric utilities to 
inform them using bill inserts, mailed brochures and advertising. Note that market research, by 
necessarily informing customers of a potential green pricing program, inherently creates perfect 
awareness concerning the program in the sample population. As a result, forecasts derived from 
market research depend critically on assumptions about customer awareness which in turn 
depend on the effectiveness of marketing. A third possibility is that actual customer participation 
in green programs may have been lowered by free-riding, because participation has commonly 
been structured as a charitable voluntary contribution. From the viewpoint of economics, the 
possibility of free riding in actual participation is of primary concern. 
Provision point mechanisms have been shown to have desirable theoretical properties 
(Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989) and to substantially reduce free riding in experimental tests when 
compared to the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) (Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker, 1989; 
Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Dawes et. aI., 1986). There have also been anecdotal reports of 
provision points being used to successfully resolve actual free riding problems (Bagnoli and 
• 
McKee, 1991). In addition, innovations of the provision point mechanism, such as a money-back ... 
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guarantee and rebate rules, have been found to increase contributions and provision frequency in 
experiments (Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker, 1989; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989; Cadsby and 
Maynes, 1999; Marks and Croson, 1998). Motivated in part by this literature, as well as by 
recent utility industry interest in voluntarily funded green power programs (see Holt and 
Associates' Green Pricing and Green Power newsletters), this paper reports the results of a paired 
laboratory and field application of a provision point mechanism using a green pricing program 
implemented by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. Both theoretical and experimental 
economists, not to mention financially constrained government agents, have long hoped for a 
practical mechanism for the private funding of public goods (see for example Groves and 
Ledyard, 1977; Smith, 1980). This research is designed to test whether this goal can be furthered 
by use of a provision point mechanism. 
In Section 2 we provide the specifics of the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
GreenChoice™ program and the provision point mechanism used. The third section replicates 
the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation mechanism in an induced value laboratory experiment 
under the assumption that, if the mechanism fails to reduce free riding in the laboratory, then it 
will fail to reduce free riding in the field. The hypothesis that this provision point mechanism 
reduces free riding is tested by comparing individual and group contributions relative to induced 
values.4 A random utility model is used to predict the probability of participation as a function 
of induced value. Free riding is not entirely eliminated. However, the probability of 
participation, at a fixed price, is positively correlated with induced value. This suggests that the 
mechanism is at least partially demand revealing. Also, what appears to be either altruism or • 
warm-glow compensates for the negative provision consequences of free riding. In Section 4, we 
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describe the field experiment and estimate a random utility model of actual program 
participation, but now on the basis of individual characteristics. Complete awareness is assured 
in the sample population, by phoning customers, describing the GreenChoice™ program, and 
allowing them to sign-up or decline the offering on the phone. Thus, eliminating unawareness as 
a reason for non-participation. A problem which tends to plague participation rates in voluntary 
programs. The sign-up rates observed in the field experiment are much higher than those of 
previous green-pricing programs using voluntary contributions. In addition, the program 
objectives and funding mechanism features are found to be important determinants of 
participation. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions concerning the use of provision points 
for the private provision of public goods and discusses remaining issues. 
2. The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation GreenChoice™ Program 
The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC), a public utility in New York State, 
sought to accelerate the development of renewable energy sources of electricity by offering its 
customers "green rates" as proposed by Moskovitz (1992, 1993). Moskovitz argued that 
customers would voluntarily sign up and agree to pay higher electricity rates if the additional 
money collected were earmarked to support renewable energy projects or other environmental 
activities. Economists were quick to point out that the selection of such a rate by a customer 
would be a charitable contribution since the mechanism proposed by Moskovitz would allow free 
riding (see Schulze, 1994).5 NMPC in turn developed the GreenChoice™ program, using a 
modified contribution mechanism in an attempt to reduce free-riding incentives. • 
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The mechanism adopted by NMPC employed three features that have been tested in the 
experimental literature. First, it contained a provision point of $864,000 to be raised through 
customer contributions. This minimum level of funding would provide for the construction of a 
renewable energy facility to serve 1,200 homes, and for the planting of 50,000 trees in the NMPC 
service area. The addition of a provision point adds multiple, efficient Nash equilibria at the 
threshold, and has been shown to increase individual pledges towards the provision of public 
goods. Unfortunately, if the threshold is not met, a provision point results in a complete loss of 
efficiency, unlike the VCM (Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker, 1989). A provision point is a practical 
tool for stating the minimum requirements for supply of a good, giving a degree of accountability 
for provision, increasing a user's stake in provision, and decreasing free riding expectations 
(Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989). Also, the provision point inherently provides greater product 
definition which market researchers advocate to achieve concreteness so that participants clearly 
understand what they will receive in return for their contributions.6 
Second, NMPC's funding mechanism offered a money-back guarantee to customers 
which assured them that, if contributions failed to reach the threshold, all money collected would 
be refunded. The money-back guarantee provided insurance to potential contributors against the 
risk of losing their contributions should the provision point not be met. In experiments where 
subjects can contribute all or none of their endowment to a public good results have been mixed 
as to the usefulness of the money-back guarantee. Dawes et al. (1986) find that the money-back 
guarantee has no significant effect on the proportion of subjects contributing to the public good. 
However, Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) find evidence to support the use of the money-back 
• 
guarantee in greater frequency of provision and greater frequency of individual contribution.? In 
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an environment where subjects can contribute any amount, Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) 
report that the guarantee significantly increases contributions; and, more recently, Cadsby and 
Maynes (1999) find greater contributions and provision frequency with both binary and 
continuous contributions. 
Third, the mechanism offered the possibility of extended benefits. Money collected in 
excess of the provision point would be used to extend benefits, or increase the production of the 
public good. Here, excess contributions were to be used to increase the number of homes served 
with renewable energy or to plant more trees. Extending benefits beyond the provision point does 
not modify individual incentives in theory, but simply creates a VCM environment beyond the 
threshold (Marks and Croson, 1998). Marks and Croson refer to this use of excess contributions 
as a "utilization rebate" rule. In evaluating alternative rebate rules for provision point 
mechanisms experimentally, Marks and Croson found that offering extended benefits, via a 
utilization rebate rule, has the greatest positive effect upon average group contributions. 
Also, the one-shot or single round nature of these experiments differs from the usual 
experimental analysis which utilizes multiple rounds. A few authors have examined one-shot 
mechanisms because they believe they are more accurate representations of actual public goods 
decisions (Alston and Nowell, 1996; Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe, 1999). However, in multiple 
round experiments, early round contributions have been significantly greater than in later rounds. 
Greater early round contributions has been attributed to strategizing behavior and confusion due 
to a lack of experience (Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Palfrey and 
Prisbrey, 1997). Cadsby and Maynes (1999) claim that the observed deterioration over rounds is • 
a special case where incentives for achieving the efficient equilibrium (i.e. threshold) are low. 
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One theoretically undesirable feature of NMPC' s mechanism was that, to legally qualify 
as a rate offering, the program could only be offered at a posted price. Thus, customers could 
only make the binary decision of choosing to contribute a fixed amount of $6.00 per month or 
not to participate at all. A posted price is undesirable because it does not allow households to 
self-select a monthly fee that better represents their preferences for the program. 8 Note that, 
despite the posted price, the mechanism does not reduce to a referendum, because only 
individuals who choose to participate pay. 
Interestingly, the only other green pricing programs to use a provision point mechanism 
of which we are aware were fully subscribed. Traverse City Light and Power completed a 
windmill project using a funding mechanism similar to NMPC's, except that it did not offer 
extended benefits. Instead, participation was curtailed after the program's provision point was 
successfully reached with 200 customers at an estimated residential premium of $7.58 per month 
(23 percent of the average residential bill) (Holt and Associates, 1996a). The City of Fort Collins 
also used a series of provision points to solicit funds for up to three separate wind turbines. (Holt 
and Associates, 1996b). By early 1997, enough customers had agreed to pay an estimated 
average premium of $10 per month to exceed the minimum provision point established to fund 
two turbines (Clements-Grote, 1997; Holt and Associates, 1997). 
In comparing these offerings with the GreenChoice™ program it is important to note that 
there are substantial differences in magnitude and scope. Both the Fort Collins and Traverse City 
programs were small, locally based programs able to focus on well-defined projects. Hence, 
•broad awareness was easily achieved. In contrast, the GreenChoice™ program, although 
intended to be offered to only the Buffalo area, for legal reasons, had to be offered to NMPC's 
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entire service area. NMPC's service area covers well over half the area of New York State. 
Consequently, marketing became a major impediment to the program. 
Unfortunately, though the GreenChoice™ program was formally approved by the New 
York Public Service Commission, it was ultimately suspended before completion because NMPC 
developed serious financial difficulties and was unable to promote customer awareness of the 
program. Most of the planned marketing campaign, including a substantial advertising budget 
and tree plantings at public schools throughout the service territory, was canceled. The program 
was only briefly mentioned in a bill insert and described in a brochure sent to about three percent 
of NMPC's customers. However, we were able to conduct a field experiment with NMPC 
customers before the program was terminated. 
3. Laboratory Experiment 
3.1. Experimental Design 
The field experiment in the next section yields information about how the provision point 
mechanism adopted by NMPC might perform with respect to participation rate when full 
consumer awareness exists, and whether or not there might be consistency between individuals' 
stated preferences and program involvement. Nevertheless, without direct knowledge of 
individual valuations, we have no way of knowing how successful the mechanism is in 
eliminating free riding or if the mechanism is demand revealing. A laboratory experiment was 
thus designed to test this funding mechanism in an environment where program values could be 
induced. If this mechanism fails to reduce free riding in the laboratory, then we would expect it • 
to fail to reduce free riding in the field. Often, in laboratory experiments with small groups, 
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"subjects just miss the provision point by slight under-contribution, a behavior termed "cheap 
riding" (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Cadsby and Maynes, 1999; Rondeau, Schulze and Poe, 
1999). In contrast, as discussed below, there is some evidence that large groups reveal some 
portion of demand when faced with a single shot provision point mechanism. 
Note, in addition to the free-riding Nash equilibrium of the voluntary contributions 
mechanism, the provision point creates theoretical Nash equilibria where costs are just covered 
by contributions. While, the money-back guarantee creates numerous Nash equilibria below the 
provision threshold where, given the decisions of others, an individual decision is 
inconsequential and does not lead to provision. In this money-back guarantee setting, the 
provision equilibria Pareto dominate the non-provision equilibria. Finally, extended benefits in 
the form of a utilization rebate can create efficient outcomes where contributions exceed the 
provision point level of contributions. These outcomes mayor may not be Nash equilibria.9 
This section describes a classroom laboratory experiment specifically designed to 
evaluate the demand revelation properties of the NMPC mechanism. In addition to designing a 
laboratory mechanism paralleling the NMPC program, this experiment deviated from the body of 
previous public goods research in three important ways. First, in contrast to most public goods 
experiments which hav~ relied on "small groups" of less than 10 individuals, this experiment 
involved 100 participants. In part, this "large group" approach was adopted so as to more closely 
reflect the NMPC field conditions. The decision to use large groups was also based on 
experimental findings of Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) that individuals in groups of 40 and 
100 contributed significantly more to a VCM public good experiment than did subjects in small • 
. 
groups (n=4 and 10). Experimental results reported in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999) further 
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suggest that a provision point mechanism (using a proportional rebate) produces contribution 
levels consistent with aggregate demand revelation in a large group setting (n=45), while the 
same mechanism results in under-revelation for small groups (n=6). A result potentially 
confounded by altruism or warm glow. A second manner in which the analysis of this 
experiment contrasts with previous public goods research is that it models individual 
contribution decisions in a provision point setting with a random utility framework. Others have 
explored various aspects of individual behavior, but few within the random utility framework and 
with respect to provision point mechanims. 1O Lastly, while this research does not test the effect 
of a rebate, to our knowledge, this laboratory experiment is the first to use a rebate with a 
provision point mechanism and money-back guarantee in a discrete contributions setting (see 
Marks and Croson, 1998, for an explicit evaluation of rebate effects in a continuous contributions 
setting). 
The experiment was performed in an undergraduate economics principles class without 
the involvement of the instructor. The students had experience in market experiments but not in 
public goods experiments. An experiment "in decision-making" was introduced at the beginning 
of a regularly scheduled class, and printed instructions were distributed after students were 
seated. Students were instructed to copy the subject number written on their instructions onto a 
blank envelope which they were also provided. Students read their instructions (see sample in 
Appendix A), after which a brief oral summary was given. Questions were answered privately by 
monitors. Students were then allowed approximately ten minutes to make a decision which shall 
be described shortly. They then sealed their instructions and decision responses in their 
• 
envelopes. Follow-up questions were distributed immediately afterward, and subject numbers 
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were copied from the envelopes to follow-up questionnaires. All materials were collected after 
the follow-up forms were completed. The sealed envelopes ensured that students could not alter 
their decisions after answering the follow-up questions. Students were not allowed to 
communicate during the experiment. 
The nature of the decision was as follows. Each participant was given a starting balance 
of $5 and the opportunity to join a group investment program for a one-time fixed fee of $3. 
Before a participant decided whether or not to join, the group investment program and payoff 
calculations were described. The group investment program would yield a return only if 40% or 
more of the participants joined. Each participant was informed that they would receive their pre­
specified "return" if this provision point was met or exceeded regardless of whether or not they 
had joined. Each subject was randomly assigned a return without replacement from a set of 100 
values, consisting of twenty of each of the values in the set {$0.50, $1.75, $3.00, $4.25, $5.50}. 
Hence, twenty subjects were assigned to each "return". Subjects were told their own return but 
were not made aware of the returns of other subjects, i.e. the distribution of other subjects was 
not known. These returns were the induced values, designed to reflect the heterogeneous values 
NMPC customers hold for the GreenChoice™ program. Ifmore than 40% joined, each 
participant also received a fixed "bonus payment" of 3¢ for each participant that joined in excess 
of the provision point. If fewer than 40% joined, the group investment program was canceled 
and all contributions were refunded. The bonus payment was public information. Only the 
induced value was private information. Marks and Croson (1999) show that this environment of 
•incomplete information, about the distribution and sum of values for the public good, does not 
undermine the provision point mechanism, providing equivalent levels of success with respect to 
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provision, Nash equilibria played, and levels of contributions produced under complete 
information. 
The fixed participation fee was selected in conjunction with the induced values to insure 
that 1) the average payoff would equal or slightly exceed the participation fee and that 2) the total 
group benefits would equal or exceed twice the total group cost if the provision point were met 
or exceeded. Total costs (TC) and benefits (TB) are illustrated in Figure 1 for a group of 100 
participants. This sample size was chosen to correspond with a large group setting, and to enable 
statistical analysis. The investment return values were chosen to be symmetric around the fixed 
fee and, based on pre-test results, to vary sufficiently to identify any relationship between 
induced value and participation for this sample size. The bonus mechanism was incorporated to 
reflect NMPC's offer of extended benefits financed by funds in excess of the provision point. 
The bonus amount of 3¢ was chosen so as to equate the aggregate group marginal benefits and 
marginal costs, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, excess contributions were symmetrically re­
distributed to the entire group---contributors and non-contributors-such that there were no 
efficiency gains and no Nash equilibria above the provision threshold. I I The instructions were 
worded so as to avoid intrinsic value associated with program context; we sought to isolate the 
effectiveness of the mechanism alone in reducing free-riding behavior. Though this removed an 
important aspect of realism associated with NMPC's GreenChoice™ program, it allows for an 
unbiased evaluation of the program's financing mechanism. Lastly, follow-up questions were 
posed to collect additional information on the participation decision (see Appendix B). The 
questions attempted to measure expectations, as well as self interest and altruistic or warm-glow • 
factors that might exogenously enter into participation decisions. 
12 
Figure 1: Total Costs and Benefits
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In summary, this experiment was designed to test the "naive" hypothesis that the 
provision point mechanism used by NMPC induces demand-revealing behavior under laboratory 
conditions. That is, we test if subjects with induced values above a posted price contribute and 
those with induced values below the posted price do not. If the mechanism is perfectly demand 
revealing, 50% of the 100 subjects should choose to participate in the program at a cost of $3, 
given the distribution of induced values: the 40% with induced values less than $3 should not 
sign up, the 40% with induced values exceeding $3 should sign up, and the 20% with the $3 
induced value should be indifferent between joining and not joining. If, like the voluntary 
contribution mechanism, the provision point features fail to induce participation to levels 
approximating demand revelation, then we would expect that the results of the field experiment 
underestimate the "true" demand for the program. However, like others, altruism or warm-glow 
may confound the interpretation of the results. 
4.2 Experimental Laboratory Results and Analysis 
At the aggregate level, 47 subjects chose to join the program and pay the $3 fee. As a 
result, the public good was funded and the efficient equilibrium was realized. Clearly, this 
participation level closely approximates the 50 percent participation rate expected under our 
naive hypothesis. Thus, given this sample design, the mechanism produces aggregate 
participation consistent with demand revelation, subject to our caveats concerning altruism and 
warm-glow. In reaching this conclusion, it is interesting to note that in the week following the 
experiment described here, the same students participated in a standard computerized VCM • 
public goods experiment. 12 Contributions in the first round of this multiple round experiment 
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were 41 percent of the maximum possible payoff (where the payoff corresponds to the induced 
value in the provision point experiment). 13 This proportion is consistent with the 40 to 60 
percent contribution levels observed by the VCM literature (Davis and Holt, 1993). Thus, the 
subjects participating in this experiment appear typical, in that they exhibit substantial free-riding 
when in a single or initial period VCM environment. 
However, inspection of participation levels across induced values does not support the 
naIve hypothesis. As shown in Figure 2, participation is generally responsive to increases in 
induced return, but the response proportions do not exhibit a sharp step at $3. Subjects with 
negative net values are contributing, in violation of their dominant Nash strategy not to do so, 
and subjects with positive net values are free riding. Therefore, we find a combination of over­
and under-revelation of demand respectively. Subjects with induced values less than the posted 
price may well be contributing because they have an additional willingness to pay from altruism 
or warm-glow. Conversely, under-revelation is labeled free-riding behavior. An analysis of 
individual behavior can shed some light on what forces are motivating participation. 
Using the random utility framework first developed by McFadden (1976), it is possible to 
test the internal consistency of participation rates observed and the hypothesis that participation 
rates increase with induced value. In this framework, it is assumed that individuals know their 
own preferences with certainty, but that they may make errors in decision-making because of 
imperfect information or errors in optimization. In addition, some aspects of the individuals' 
preferences are not observable by the analyst, and treated as random.. These limitations introduce 
•
a stochastic error component into the modeling of decisions (Maddala, 1983). Using such a 
model, we shall first specify the random utility equivalent of the na'ive null hypothesis, in which a 
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Figure 2: Actual Joining Distribution 
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customer will sign-up for the program at posted price $C if the utility associated with having the 
program and paying $C is greater than the utility associated with not having the program. If we 
assume that indirect utility is additively separable, the probability of a "yes" response to a 
particular posted price is then: 
(2) Pr{ "Yes" response} =Pr{ V - C + E > O} 
where V is an individual's value or willingness to pay for the green program and E is an error 
term. Assuming that the error is logistically distributed, Equation (2) can be expressed as: 
(3)	 Pr{ "Yes" response} = __~1--;:"'7:"'"-:::
 
1 + e-(U + ~(v - e))
 
where a and ~ are respectively location and slope parameters to be estimated. The null 
hypothesis HoI: a = 0 corresponds to the hypothesis that, at V = C, there is a 50 percent 
participation level. A positive value for a would shift the entire distribution to the left in a 
manner consistent with over-revelation relative to induced values, while under-revelation would 
correspond to a < O. The null hypothesis for the slope parameter Ho 2: ~ = 0 has only a one-sided 
alternative ~ > O. That is, we are testing the hypothesis that participation does not increase with 
induced value. 
Note, from Equation (3) that for ~ > 0, the relationship between induced value and 
participation becomes an "S" shaped function with the introduction of logistically distributed 
random errors. Additionally, if a = 0, when induced value equals cost (V = C), participation is 
50%; as V-C becomes large, participation approaches 100%; and for small V relative to C, • 
participation ultimately approaches 0%. The shape, or rather steepness, of the response function 
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does vary with the magnitude of~. If ~ = 0, the probability of participation is a constant, but for 
large ~, a step function is predicted. Figure 3 shows this relationship for a range of ~ values. 
Estimates of a and ~ using maximum likelihood techniques are found in the "base" 
column of Table 1. 14 Consistent with our hypotheses, a is not significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the hypothesis of 50% participation at V-C = 0 cannot be rejected statistically. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on V-C, ~, is positive and significant. This latter result 
supports the hypothesis that participation is positively correlated with induced value. 15 In all, 
these results are consistent with the na'ive hypothesis that this mechanism is demand revealing. 
Table 1: Estimated Logit Models Using Induced Values 
Variable (coefficient) Base Long 
-0.093Constant (ao) 
(0.211 
Group/Self (al) 3.688 
(0.856)*** 
0.337 0.301 
(0.123)*** (0.143)*** 
Induced Return (~) 
N 98 98 
8.02*** 38.19***Likelihood Ratio 2 
61 73Percent Correctly Predicted 
*** indicates significance level of 1 percent. 
However, in spite of the highly significant estimation results reported in Table 1, closer ­
examination of the data reveals that the model is not completely characterizing individual 
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Figure 3: Random Utility Model for Various Betas 
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decisions. Recall Figure 2, actual participation at lower values (e.g. V = 0.50) exceeds the zero 
percent participation predicted by theory. There is also an obvious dip at the induced value of 
$5.50. Figure 4 (an alternative depiction of Figure 2 with, instead, induced value minus cost on 
the horizontal-axis), shows the fit achieved by the base regression model. Over- and under­
provision are clearly not captured. The remainder of this section summarizes an exploratory 
investigation of why these deviations occur by focusing on altruistic or warm-glow and free­
riding motivations. This extended analysis is intended, in part, to further demonstrate the 
opportunities arising from a random utility modeling framework in future experimental 
economics research. The objective is to also provide an empirical base and motivation for future 
theoretical research. 
It is worth noting that none of the subjects viewed themselves as "critical" to provision. 
None of the subjects entered 39 in response to the follow-up question about how many people 
they believe joined, excluding themselves. However, one subject entered 40, believed the 
program was funded and joined. It is reasonable to believe that they may have thought they were 
"critical." This apparently lack of the perception of being critical supports the findings of Dawes 
et al. (1986) yet contradicts the findings of Rapoport (1988). 
An advantage of random utility modeling is that it allows other explanatory variables to 
be incorporated into the error based decision framework. In an effort to account for 
heterogeneous, exogenous motives, subjects were asked to indicate the importance they attached 
to maximizing their own earnings and to maximizing group earnings in making their decision, 
both on seven-point scales (l =Not Important, 7 =Extremely Important). Each of these questions 
• 
are provided in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4: Actual vs. Logit Estimated Distribution 
(By Induced Value minus Cost) 
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The self-reported interest in maximizing "group" and "self" earnings were combined in a 
"group/self" ratio so as to normalize relative responses at the individual level. In other words, a 
response pattern group=5, self=5 would be assigned a group/self ratio of 1, as would the response 
pattern group=2, self=2. In terms of Equation (3), this ratio (group/self) is included by expanding 
a from a constant to a vector and treating the ratio group/self as a separate element of the vector. 
As such, argument a in Equation (3) becomes <X<Jrand = ~ + a\ *(group/self). The expectation is 
that participation is positively related to group orientation, and thus aJ should be positive with a 
corresponding null hypothesis Ho 3 ; al = 0. To account for this ratio, the null hypothesis Hoi: a 
= 0, must be restated as Ho 4 ; <X<Jrand= (~+ al*(group/self)) = 0. As before, a positive value for 
<X<Jrand would shift the entire distribution to the left, indicating "over-revelation" associated with 
altruism or warm-glow. A negative <X<Jrand would shift the distribution to t~e right, providing 
evidence of free-riding. 
The results from including this ratio in the estimation are provided in the "long" column 
of Table 1. The estimated coefficient al is positive and significant, i.e. the average respondent 
exhibits behavior suggesting the presence of altruistic or warm-glow value. Notably, the 
inclusion of this variable does not have a significant effect on the slope coefficient, but does 
greatly increase the explanatory power of the estimated model, as demonstrated by the jump in 
the percentage of responses correctly predicted and the likelihood ratio chi square values. Thus 
we argue that the addition of this variable makes a significant contribution to the explanatory 
power of the decision making model. 
This result is consistent with Andreoni's (1995) arguments concerning the role of altruism • 
... 
in public goods experiments as well as the speculations of van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes 
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-(1983), Rapoport (1988), Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989), and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) 
regarding the presence of altruism. However, Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) formally test for and 
find significant evidence of warm-glow in VCM contributions but no trace of altruism. Based on 
their convincing analysis, we speculate that warm-glow underlies the observed over-contributing 
captured by a positive (X]. In addition, as discussed earlier, the nature of one-shot environments 
suggests that some portion of single round contributions may be due to confusion (Palfrey and 
Prisbrey also find evidence of confusion in the contribution behavior they observe). 16 
Overall, however, setting the group/own ratio at its mean (0.61), <X(;rand is not significantly 
different from zero at any standard level of significance: (XGrand =-0.01 (s.e. =0.25). As such, 
the nai've null hypothesis Ho 4 : <X(;rand =0 still cannot be rejected for the average respondent in 
spite of the fact that the individual coefficients used in calculating <X(;rand are each significantly 
different from zero. In other words, the warm-glow behavior of subjects with induced values of 
$0.50, $1.75, and $3.00, as captured by the positive and significant (XI estimate, is being canceled 
out by the traditional free-riding behavior of subjects with the higher induced values (recall 
Figure 2). A similar phenomenon is observed by Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999). It is 
interesting to note however that <X(;rand is significantly different from zero in the expected 
directions when the ratio group/self falls below 0.47 or exceeds 0.77. These results are 
consistent with previous research using split-sample designs to examine subject group effects in 
public good provision experiments, and provide additional evidence that participants bring 
different motives into experimental settings (Ledyard, 1995). From the perspective of this paper, 
these results, in the "controlled environment" of the laboratory, further heighten the importance 
... 
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of identifying respondent characteristics and preferences that may affect actual participation 
levels in field experiments. 
4. Field Experiment 
The findings in the previous section imply that participation elicited using a provision 
point mechanism is sensitive to private value for the public good, as well as other motives which 
might include altruism, warm-glow, and confusion. In general, the one-shot NMPC provision 
point mechanism appears to create an environment capable of increasing contributions and 
improving the probability of provision for whatever public good is offered. Fortunately, we were 
able to directly solicit actual contributions before NMPC cancelled GreenChoice™. The results 
of this effort allowed us to evaluate the individual incentives of actual participation when private 
values are unknown. Below we investigate these incentives with analysis of the participation 
effects of the GreenChoice™ program's green objectives and provision point financing features, 
as well as the characteristics of individual participants. 
4.1. Experimental Design 
The field experiment was conducted as part of a larger National Science 
FoundationlEnvironmental Protection Agency research effort to investigate environmental values 
for public programs (Poe, Clark, and Schulze, 1997). A telephone survey was utilized to attempt 
to contact a random sample of 206 households in the Buffalo area:l ? The telephone survey began 
by screening customers to identify the person in the household who usually pays the NMPC 
electric bill. Once that person was on the phone, the interviewer described the purpose of the 
• 
.. 
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survey and the sponsors of the study. The individual was then asked to rate NMPC's service. 
This allowed the small number of dissatisfied customers to vent frustration before answering the 
remaining questions. Customer awareness of the GreenChoice™ program was obtained next, 
and then the goals of the program were described in turn. As the goals were described, the 
respondent was asked: 
How interested are you in the goal of replacing fossil energy with renewable energy 
sources? On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all interested and 10 is very 
interested, how interested are you? 
and later: 
How interested are you in the goal ofplanting trees on public lands in upstate New York? 
As before, on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all interested and 10 is very 
interested, how interested are you? 
The funding plan was then described as follows: 
The GreenChoice program would be funded voluntarily. Customers who decide to join 
the program would pay an additionalfixedfee of$6 per month on their NMPC bill. This 
fee would not be tax deductible. Customers would sign up or cancel at any time. While 
customers sign up, NMPC would askfor bids on renewable energy projects. Enough 
customers would have to become GreenChoice partners to pay for the program. For 
example if 12,000 customers joined the first year, they would invest $864,000, which 
would allow Niagara Mohawk to plant 50,000 trees andfund a landfill gas project. The 
gas project could replace all fossil fuel electricity in 1,200 homes. However, ifafter one 
year, participation were insufficient to fund GreenChoice activities, Niagara Mohawk 
would cancel the program and refund all the money that was collected. 
The program description was taken more or less directly from the program brochure prepared by 
NMPC. Note that NMPC was deliberately vague about the exact level of the provision because 
the renewable energy project was to be sent out for competitive bid. This feature should be 
irrelevant, since changing the threshold level and even knowledge of the threshold level has been 
• 
shown to be inconsequential in the presence of a money-back guarantee (Cadsby and Maynes, 
1999; Rondeau, Poe, and Schulze, 1999). 
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The survey then asked respondents whether the mechanism features of the funding 
program made them more or less interested in the program (see section 3.2 for details). This was 
followed by the participation question. It was phrased as follows: 
You may need a moment to consider the next couple ofquestions. Given your 
household's income and expenses, I'd like you to think about whether or not you would 
be interested in the GreenChoice program. If you decide to sign up, we will send your 
name to Niagara Mohawk, and get you enrolled in the program. All your other answers 
to this survey will remain confidential. Does your household want to sign up for the 
program at a cost of$6.00 per month? 
Note that participation was not hypothetical. Participants were informed that their names were to 
be sent to NMPC for enrollment. 18 Although actual monies were never collected because the 
program was suspended, this sign up now/pay later approach corresponds with the following 
stepwise process typically used in green pricing programs: I) potential projects are described; 2) 
subscriptions from customers are elicited through direct marketing, bill inserts and advertising; 
and 3) money is collected through regular billing. Experience from the Traverse City project 
suggests that the payment to intention ratio is very high--in that case, Traverse City Light and 
Power found that approximately 5% of those who originally signed-up reneged. 
The survey ends with socioeconomic questions useful for modeling demand. 
3.2. Results and Analysis 
Of the sample of 206 households, contact was made with 179. 19 Of these, 34 refused to 
participate and three could not complete the questionnaire. Thus, 142 respondents completed the 
survey, yielding a response rate of 69% of the base sample. Of the 142,29 signed up for the 
-

program, resulting in a participation rate of 20.4 percent. Ifwe assume that the 37 households ... 
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who refused or could not complete the survey would also have refused the program, the 
participation rate would fall to 16.2 percent. Both these estimates stand in marked contrast to the 
actual sign-up rate of less than 3.3 percent observed by NMPC throughout the period 
GreenChoice™ was offered via bill inserts and brochures.2o As discussed previously, this low 
participation was likely caused by the minimal marketing and low customer awareness of the 
program. Indeed, none of the 142 randomly sampled respondents in our survey recalled having 
heard about the program. Participation rates of 16.2 and 20.4 percent are consistent with a 
preliminary market evaluation of the NMPC service area conducted by the Research Triangle 
Institute (RTI) (Wood et ai. 1994), which estimated that with full awareness 17 percent would 
adopt a tree planting program at a $6 monthly premium?1 The RTI data were taken from a 
sample that over-sampled "green" customers, since such customers were regarded as the target 
group for an actual program. Based on prior information, approximately 30 percent of urban 
NMPC customers were classified as "green", while the in-person interview sample was 67 
percent "green". 
It is important to note that a participation rate of 16%-20% is substantially higher than the 
1% potentially needed to fund GreenChoice™ (12,000 of a total of 1.2 million NMPC 
customers) as well as the participation rates observed by the majority of actual green pricing 
programs reported in the literature (Byrnes, Jones, and Goodman 1999; Baugh et ai. 1995; 
Byrnes et al. 1995; Holt and Associates, 1996; Farhar and Houston 1996). As suggested earlier, 
however, there are notable differences between our experiment and the majority of previous 
studies. First, reported participation rate estimates have generally not been adjusted to account • 
.. 
for program awareness, which was controlled in our study at 100 percent. Instead, participation 
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rates have typically been defined over total customer base or over the base of customers targeted 
with direct mailings. Previous participation experiments have also (with the two exceptions 
noted previously) relied on voluntary contri~utions rather than the provision point mechanism 
used here. The findings of Byrnes, Jones, and Goodman (1999) support these conclusions. They 
provide complete program awareness while obtaining voluntary contributions. The resulting 5.6 
to 10 percent participation rates are higher than most observed in implemented green-pricing 
programs but below those observed here. 
To investigate individual specific factors associated with participation decisions, we 
again turn to the random utility model (McFadden, 1976). The linear logistic distribution is 
assumed to characterize individual decisions, 
(1)	 Pr{ "Yes" response} = __~1_-:-:-_ 
1+ e-aX 
where X depicts a vector of covariates characterizing individuals and their perceptions of the 
program (including a constant term), and g is the corresponding set of coefficients to be 
estimated. A separate independent variable and corresponding coefficient for value can not be 
included in the model since individual values are unobserved and cost is constant across all 
respondents. 
Assuming this logistic distribution, participation decisions are modeled as a function of 
three categories of covariates elicited in the questionnaire. The first concerns respondents' 
perceptions of the program's worth. Respondents registered their interest in the twin goals of the 
• 
GreenChoice™ program -- replacing fossil fuels and planting trees in upstate New York -- using 
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a scale of one ("not at all interested") to 10 ("very interested") for each goal.22 It is expected that 
the sign on these variables will be positively correlated with the probability of joining the 
program. 
The second category of covariates includes variables specific to the respondent, such as 
gender (Male=1), age (Years), education (College Graduate or higher =1), and recent financial 
support of environmental groups (Yes=1). Such characteristics are widely used as explanatory 
covariates in the environmental valuation literature. Based on this literature, it is expected that 
age will be negatively correlated with WTP, while recent financial support for environmental 
groups will be positively correlated with joining the program. The other variables have provided 
mixed results in the literature. In addition, as noted earlier, individual perception of NMPC 
service was elicited using a one ("unfavorable ") to 10 ("very favorable") scale and included as a 
covariate in the analysis. 
The final category of covariates concerns respondents' perceptions of the provision point 
mechanism itself. After hearing about the funding provision point and money-back guarantee, 
respondents were asked the following two questions: 
Does the fact that there is a minimum level ofcustomer participation required for
 
GreenChoice to operate make the program of less interest to you, more interest, or does
 
it not affect your interest?
 
Does the fact that Niagara Mohawk would refund all the money it collects -- if support is
 
insufficient -- make GreenChoice of less interest to you, more interest, or does it not
 
affect your interest in the program?
 
These variables are admittedly ad hoc, in the sense they do not proxy for the value of the 
• program. However, they do provide information about perceptions regarding these specific 
components of the provision point mechanism. We found that over 55 percent responded that 
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their interest was not affected by including a provision point and about 16 and 27 percent 
indicated that it respectively increased and decreased their interest in the program. In contrast, 
the money-back guarantee was widely favored: only 9 percent of respondents indicated that this 
attribute reduced their interest in the program, while 46 percent indicated that it increased their 
interest. For the purpose of modeling the participation decision, these response categories were 
re-coded as binary variables assigned' I' if the "more interest" option was selected, and zero 
otherwise. We expect their estimated coefficients to be positive. 
The logit model of program participation is reported in Table 2, together with the sample 
means, standard deviations, and the expected signs of the estimated coefficients for all the 
explanatory variables described above. Given the single $6 threshold, the estimation results are 
fairly strong: 80 percent of the responses are correctly predicted and the overall likelihood greatly 
exceeds the critical value (LR=31.03 > 14.68 = X2010(9)). 
Considered jointly, the estimated coefficients for the two program goals are significant 
using a likelihood ratio test (LR = 7.23 > 4.61 = X20.10(2)), leading to the conclusion that there is 
a positive response to the tree-planting and renewable energy objectives of theNMPC program. 
Comparison of the individual coefficient estimates suggests that, in spite of the observation that 
more people favored the tree planting objective, interest in fossil fuel replacement is a more 
significant predictor of participation decisions. The implication is that tree programs will have 
. broad general support, but that interest in the fossil fuel replacement component will be the 
significant explanatory factor in participation decisions. This finding is consistent with the 
NMPC market research (Wood et ai., 1994). • 
.. 
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Table 2. Estimated Logit Models of NMPC Phone Participants 
Variable Mean Expected Sign Estimated Coefficients 
[Scale] 
Constant n.a. -4.386 
(2.184)" 
Replace Fossil Fuel 
[1-10] 
6.27 
(2.82) 
+ 0.233 
(0.118)" 
Plant Trees 
[1-10] 
8.35 
(2.18) 
+ 0.216 
(0.186) 
Gender 
[Male = 1] 
0.46 
(0.50) 
'1 0.954 
(0.517), 
Age 
[Numeric] 
55.09 
(15.70) 
-0.0396 
(0.0192)" 
Give to Environment 
[Yes = 1] 
0.19 
(0.39) 
+ 0.666 
(0.624) 
College Graduate 
[Grad = 1] 
0.45 
(0.50) 
+'1 0.002 
(0.546) 
Rating of NMPC Service 
[ lO=ver ood] 
8.49 
(1.67) 
+'1 0.082 
(0.644) 
Min. Participation 
[More Interested = 1] 
0.17 
(0.38) 
+ 1.416 
(0.588)" 
Money-back Guarantee 
[More Interested = 1] 
0.47 
(0.50) 
+ -0.098 
(0.550) 
Numbers in 0 are standard errors.
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
 
A joint test of the null hypothesis that restricts all demographic coefficients to zero was 
X2rejected at the 10 percent level (LR =10.28> 9.24 = 0.10(5». The estimated coefficients on 
respondent attributes vary in significance, consistent with other studies in the environmental 
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Likelihood Ratio 31.03'" 
N 
2 
Percent Correctly Predicted 80 
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valuation literature. Age was negatively correlated with participation (also a result in Byrnes, 
Jones, and Goodman 1999), a factor that may be attributed to the life cycle hypothesis of value in 
which potential use values decline with age (Cropper and Sussman, 1990). This negative relation 
may also be associated with the fact that age is also inversely correlated with income in this data 
set. 23 The finding that male respondents had a higher likelihood of participation contrasts with 
evidence suggesting that this variable is not substantially related to environmental concerns (Van 
Liere and Dunlap, 1980). The coefficients on the other socio-demographic covariates were not 
significantly different from zero. 
From our perspective, the coefficients on the funding mechanism variables are of 
considerable interest, despite their ad hoc nature. Considered jointly, these variables are 
significant ((LR = 5.84 > 4.61 = X20.10(2)). In particular, interest in the provision point 
mechanism is a significant and positive explanatory variable in participation decisions. The 
minority of respondents with interest in that feature clearly had a higher participation rate, 
suggesting that the addition of this feature increases the likelihood of funding. In contrast, 
interest in the money-back guarantee is not a significant explanatory variable in the estimated 
model in spite of the fact that there appears to be a widespread interest in the money-back 
guarantee. 
In summary, modeling of participation decisions indicates that the content and structural 
attributes of the NMPC mechanism are influential in participation decisions. The program goals 
of replacing fossil fuel energy and planting tree are important to participation decisions, 
particularly the former. In addition, the provision point feature increases participation. ­
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Green pricing programs have come under substantial criticism in the electric utility 
industry because of their cost and poor customer participation. Our field experiment shows that 
customers who are made fully aware of a green pricing program, and who face a binary decision 
within a provision point mechanism with money-back guarantee and extended benefits, 
participate at a relatively high rate (between 16 and 20 percent). Recall, the two completed 
programs in which provision points were utilized succeeded in funding local projects with 
relatively high levels of participation. Further, our laboratory examination of the NMPC 
mechanism found results consistent with demand revelation at the aggregate level and partial 
demand revelation at the individual level, i.e. the probability of participation was positively 
correlated with induced value. Additional investigation revealed that warm-glow like behavior 
and free-riding incentives were significant counter-balancing factors in overall participation. 
While the persistence of free riding in the lab suggests that the field experiment results likely 
underestimate true demand, the field results suggest that subjects respond to the features of this 
provision point mechanism, increasing contributions and the likelihood of provision. This 
suggests that the disappointing sign-up rates of most green pricing programs to date could well 
be due to increased free riding associated with mechanism design, as well as to the problem of 
limited customer awareness. Employing a provision point mechanism is a relatively costless way 
to increase participation. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult, time consuming, and expensive to raise customer awareness 
for new programs such as GreenChoice™. Economists should recognize the large impediment • 
that consumer awareness plays for the private provision of public goods. The NMPC program 
33 
may well have failed, even if implementation had been carried through, simply because the 
company was unable to expend sufficient resources to effectively market a statewide program. 
The successful provision point programs in Traverse City and Fort Collins funded local rather 
than statewide projects; so, given the high profile nature of wind energy projects, awareness was 
easily achieved. This research found that, where large groups are involved in a single 
solicitation, provision point mechanisms may fulfill the objective of privately funding public 
goods. 
• 
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APPENDIX A: Sample Subject Instructions for the Laboratory Experiment 
Subject Number __
 
PRINT your Name and Social Security Number so that we can pay you
 
Name ::--_~-=-=_-=- _ 
Social Security Number _ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
First, please write your subject number on the front of the envelope you have been given. 
You have been given the envelope to insure confidentiality. 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions 
closely and make decisions carefully, you can earn money. Please do not communicate with any 
other students during the experiment. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to raise your 
hand so that someone can come over and answer your questions individually. 
In this experiment all participants are given a starting balance of $5, which is yours to keep or 
use any way you like. At the end of these instructions, all of you will be asked if you want to join a 
group investment program for a one-time fee of $3. The exact amount of money that you will 
earn in the experiment depends on your answer to this investment question, as well as on the 
answers of ALL the other participants in your group. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be calculated and you will be paid in cash. 
Once you understand the group investment program and how your earnings will be 
calculated, your task is to decide whether or not you want to join the group investment program for 
a fixed fee of $3. 
The group investment program works as follows. You are a member of a group of 100 
people in this class. The program will only be funded and implemented if at least 40 of the 100 
participants in your group join the investment program. If enough participants join the investment 
program so that the program is implemented, the return on the investment will be SHARED BY 
ALL participants in the experiment, investors and non-investors alike. Specifically, regardless 
of whether or not you have joined the group investment program, if enough people join, you 
will receive a return of $5.50. You will also receive a bonus payment of 3¢ for each participant 
that joins in excess of the minimum number of 40 necessary for the group program to be 
implemented. Furthermore, you keep your initial credit of $5 from which $3 will be deducted if 
• 
you decide to join the investment program. Note that other participants may have a different 
return but do not have a different bonus. 
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If not enough participants join the investment program, the program will not be funded and 
will be canceled. In this case all the $3 fees collected will be refunded to those who joined. Thus, 
regardless of your decision to join the program or not, you would keep your $5 starting balance. 
To Summarize: 
- You must decide whether or not to join a group investment program for a cost of $3. 
- If fewer than 40 participants out of 100 join, the program will be canceled and all $3 fees will be 
refunded. 
- If 40 or more participants join, the program will be implemented and you will receive a return of 
$5.50 plus a bonus of 3¢ for each household that joins above 40. 
- Recall, that you do not need to join to receive your payment from the investment program if 40 or 
more other participants join. 
- But if you do join, you must pay the $3 fee. 
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand. 
THE QUESTION 
Do you want to join the group investment program for a fixed fee of $3? 
(Circle one only) 
YES I wish to join 
NO I do not wish to join 
Please place this sheet in the envelope provided and seal it. When everyone has sealed their 
envelope, you will each be handed another sheet of questions. You must complete these 
additional questions in order to get paid. • 
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APPENDIX B: Follow Up Questions for Laboratory Experiment 
TO BE PAID, YOU MUST COMPLETE THESE QUESTIONS 
Please enter your Subject Number from your envelope _ 
PRINT your Name and Social Security Number as you did before 
Name ~__~_~	 _ 
Social Security Number	 _ 
(1)	 Do you think that enough people joined to fund the group investment program? 
(Circle one answer) 
YES NO 
(la) More precisely, how many people do you think joined--excluding yourself? 
(2)	 On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is not important and 7 is extremely important, 
how important were the following in your decision? 
2a. I wanted to make as much money as I could for myself. (Circle one number)
 
2 3 4 5 6 7
 
Not Important Extremely important
 
2b. I wanted the group to make as much money as possible.	 (Circle one number)
 
2 3 4 5 6 7
 
Not Important Extremely important
 
• 
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pp. 100-10 I), the increased provision proportion with the money-back guarantee is significant with 
.. a provision point of three contributors (x =1.60 > 1.55 = x* for a one-tail test at 6% from the 
standard normal distribution) but is not with a provision point of five contributors (x =0.69). 
-

43 
8 Cadsby and Maynes (1999), in a comparison of threshold experiments with continuous 
contributions and binary discrete contributions, find increased contributions and provision in the 
case of continuous contributions. 
9 For a pareto superior outcome when contributions exceed the provision point in the presence of 
extended benefits, an individual contribution must lead to group extended benefits in excess of the 
individual contribution amount. If the individual's share of the extended benefits from their 
contribution exceeds the individual contribution amount then the outcome is also a Nash 
equilibrium (Marks and Croson, 1998). 
10 RUM applications in public goods experiments are relatively new. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) 
and Spencer, Swallow, and Miller (1998) analyze individual behavior using the RUM in VCM 
experiments and contingent choice experiments respectively. 
II Unlike a proportional rebate which re-distributes to contributors only. Both the NMPC 
utilization rebate and the proportional rebate are Pareto neutral. 
12 The experiment was developed by the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of 
Arizona. The experiment was conducted (using monetary incentives) as part of the students' 
regular weekly sections held in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Decision Research 
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13 This contribution figure is based on 84 valid VCM observations from the same 100 students. 
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student information data. 
14 Only 98 observations are reported in Table 2, due to the fact that two respondents had missing 
values for various parts of the questionnaire. 
15 This finding is consistent with those of Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) and Palfrey and Prisbrey 
(1997). Each found, in VCM environments, that average contributions and participation increase 
with greater relative induced value for the public good. 
16 Altruism is the value received from increasing returns to the group. Warm-glow is the value 
received from the act of giving. Altruistic value increases as group benefits increase. Warm-glow 
value is constant, unaffected by group or private returns from the public good. Our experimental 
design does not allow us to disentangle altruism from warm-glow. Separating the two could be 
accomplished by varying the group return as in Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997). 
17 The survey instrument followed the Dillman Total Design Method for telephone surveys 
(Dillman, 1978) which is designed to achieve a high overall response rate by keeping text blocks ­
short and clear and by engaging the respondent with frequent questions throughout the survey. The 
response rate was just under 70%. The survey was pretested by administering successive draft 
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versions by phone until respondents clearly understood the instrument. Hagler Bailly Consulting, 
Inc. was contracted to administer the survey. Prior to telephone contact, potential respondents 
were sent a hand-signed cover letter on Cornell University stationery. The letter informed them 
that they had been selected as one of a small sample of customers to participate in the study of a 
new type of environmental program. It identified the study's sponsors as the National Science 
Foundation and the Environmental Protection Agency, together with NMPC, and enclosed a two 
dollar bill as a token of appreciation for participation. The two dollar bill has been found to be cost 
effective in increasing response rates. 
18 In an analysis of Wisconsin and Colorado green-pricing programs, Byrnes, Jones, and Goodman 
(1999) find that market simulations of this sort are better predictors of actual participation. 
19 Households were classified as "unable to contact" based on a minimum of eight attempts. 
20 NMPC had 0.1 percent of their 1.2 million customers sign-up. Recall, that they sent bill inserts 
and brochures to three percent of their 1.2 million customers, i.e. 36,000 customers. Hence, 3.3 
percent of the 36,000 signed-up. 
21 However, RTI also estimated that 57 percent of customers not classified as "green" would 
adopt a renewable energy investment program at a $6 monthly premium, while 79 percent of 
"green" customers would adopt the same program. 
22 Respondents were also asked how they viewed the program in comparison with other causes 
they might support "like the United Way, public television, or environmental groups, " using a 
scale of one ("much less favorably") to 10 ("much more favorably") as a means of consolidating 
their preferences immediately prior to answering the participation question. Response to this 
question is not included here since it was found to be a statistically significant function of the type 
of project as well as the mechanism attributes. 
23 In the linear random utility model used in this analysis, income cancels out of the equation 
(Hanemann, 1984) and is therefore not included here. 
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